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Abstract: After deregulations in power industries, the
original boundary lines have been removed and how to
support optimal cross-border electricity trade planning has
become an important issue. Decentralization, or all market
participants have the rights to participate in decision
making, is one of the directions. In this paper a
decentralized structure is suggested to solve the problem
using multi-agent technology. In this structure the
information centralization is prevented and each market
participant behaves rationally based on local information.
Although the market participants make decisions to protect
its own benefits, the minimum production and transmission
cost of the whole system can be reached tinally. This
structure is based on the method proposed in [5] and
implemented on computer via a multi-agent system using
Java programming language. A demonstration on a 5-area
test system shows that the suggested new approach is
effective and promising.
Keywords: power market, cross-border trade plan,
decentralized optimization, multi-agent technology
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, power industry has been undergoing
deregulations to introduce competitions among market
participrmts in order to provide consumers with better
quality of service (QoS) and more reasonable prices. The
once centralized planning and decision making must now
be adapted to the new market structure. Internet and
related technologies, such as, World-wide Web (WWW),
also supported the shaping of the new market structure,
where more and more information or decisions about
market are transmitted through Internet. Which increase
the transparency and efficiency of market operation.
Decentralization, or market participants “have the rights to
participate in the decision making, is one of the directions
for utility companies to move.
Usually an interconnected power system consists of
several regional networks with the tie-lines connected to
each other. Under transmission open access, the electricity
trade inside a regional system can be handled locally, While
the electricity trades among regional systems should pay
for the usage of tie lines and the regional networks along
the transaction paths. It is clear that wholesale cross-border
trades should be considered together with the transmission
cost in advance with tie line capacity limits included. In
this paper, we are using the European network as an
example to study the wholesale cross-border trade planning,
but the considerations are equally applicable for all the
interconnected networks.
Electricity production in the European Union (EU) has
for decades been based on monopoly production and 15
separate, national markets. Community Directive 96/92/EC
has brought about a change to develop the common
electricity market in Europe [1]. However there are several
considerations for the common rule of transmission open
access: (1) In order to schedule such wholesale cross-
border trade, a central transmission system operator (TSO)
seems to be necessary to collect all the information and do
the calculations. Although for system security purposes it
seems to be necessary anyway, the member TSOS may be
opposed to this idea mostly for political reasons. (2) It is
hard to ask for extreme equality when the national
transmission systems facing native demands and foreign
demands at the same time. How to obtain the optimum with
the consideration of priority?
Generally there are two basic approaches to handle the
wholesale cross-border trade schedule. One is the central
schedule approach where the market operator is responsible
to work out an optimal cross-border transmission schedule
at minimum transmission cost with consideration of system
operation constraints and then allocates the cost to
individual transactions. Centralized optimization methods
can be used for the first task, such as Ref. [2] and [3]. Very
otlen market participants might doubt the fairness of the
centrally announced results. Besides the central
optimization has to be re-calculated whenever a new
transaction is added. The other approach is the
decentralized schedule, which uses the invisible market
hand to solve the problem by market participants
themselves. One such implementation [4] uses the Bilateral
Shapley Value to negotiate in multilateral trades via a
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multi-agent system. This approach avoids the centralized
decision making of the market operator and is quite
attractive to market participants. However the optimal
social welfare is not guarantied. In Ref. [5], a decentralized
method is suggested base on ‘first come, fust serve’ rule to
implement the cross-border trade planning with the help of
multi-agent technology. However in order to keep the
system security and improve the speed, a central sever is
still required.
In this paper, we are going to suggest a decentralized
structure based on the method proposed in [5]. In the new
structure, the centralized information collection is
prevented and each regional system acts rationally based on
local information to search its own benefits. However the
total transmission cost is minimized after such self-
protective decisions. The significant advantage of this
structure lies in that it is based on each participant’s rational
behavior and any super controller can be avoided.
‘I’hepaper is organized as follows: in next section, we
shall first present the mathematical model of the problem in
its centralized optimal format. Then our decentralized
approach is introduced. In section III, we give out detailed
model of multi-agent system. System implementations and
complexities are introduced in Section IV. In section V, we
use a 5-area example system to illustrate negotiations
among participants. Conclusions are made in the last
section.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
(a)
(b)
(c)
The basic assumptions used in our study are as follows:
The transmission price of each tie line is a constant and
announced in $per unit power flow. The transmission
limits of tie lines are known in per unit. For simplicity,
the transmission loss is neglected (Its cost can be
included approximately into the tie line transmission
price) and the power flow of each tie line is
controllable.
An area is clarified as supply, demand or transit area if
its net injection power Pj is greater than, less than or
equal to zero. Pi,mmis the net injection capacity of area
i when Pi~O. The net generation capacity Pi,ma for a
supply area and the load demand of a demand area are
all known.
There are enough generation capacities to meet the
load demands in the entire inter-connected system and
the tie-line capacity is enough such that all the
demands can be satisfied via proper schedule.
For the wholesale cross-border trades scheduling
problem, the math model for the c~ntralized optimal
decision can be formulated as follows:
min ~ Cij. fij + ~(ti. ~fJ+~ (f, Xfk,)
(i, j).zA id ,j:(i,,j)~A ieD, T k:(k,i)=d
‘t ~.fii - ~fki ‘pi ‘0ri=1121...9n (1)
j:(iJeA k:(k,i)eA
0< $Ij < f~grncn for all (i,j) E A
o<~<~mm for all i GS
where
h’
h,mm :
@ “
tj :
S, D,
A:
n:
power flow on the tie-line from region i to region j,
and~j>O;
capacity of the lie-line from region i to regionj;
price of per unit power flow for usage of tie-line (i,j);
price of per unit power flow for usage of network of
area i;
~ denote supply, demand and transit area sets
respectively,
entire tie line set with m directed tie-line flows;
total number of areas.
The three terms of the objective fimction in (1) are the
total costs for tie-lines usage; the total fees for usage of all
supply area networks; and the total fees for the usage of
other area networks respectively. It should be noticed that
the generation cost is not included in the objective fimction
for simplicity. There is no difficulty to include generation
cost of each supply area into the problem. This is realized
through introducing a fictitious ‘supply area - tie line’ set
with the tie line transmission price equal to the generation
cost of the supply area and the original supply area
becomes a ‘transit’ area in the new system.
Initialization:fj:=0
1
ti
(1) search for the cheapest path from any
(2) get supphed with the feasible quantity;
(3) update the corresponding ~j;
i := one of the un-
served demands
N
&Youtput <1
Figurel: flow chart of the decentralized approach
A decentralized approach is proposed in Ref. [5] to
solve the linear optimization problem (1). The basic idea is
that within each round of iteration, one demand i searches
for the cheapest path to get supplied from any available
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generation areaj, The quantity of the supply is the minimal
value of following three parameters: the un-served demand
of area i, the available generating capacity of areaj, and the
available transmission capacity of path flom area j to area i.
This process is repeated again and again all the loads in the
whole system are totally satisfied. The flow chart is shown
in figure 1. Using the inductive method, we proved that the
final flow of the network from the decentralized approach
above is the same as that from the centralized optimization
defined in (l). Detailed algorithm and proof can be found
in [5].
The advantages of the new approach are apparent:
(a) There is no need for a central coordinator. Each
demand area searches for the cheapest path to satis@
its own need.
(b) Every demand area is satisfied with its choice based
on the available cheapest path and doesn’t need to
worry about the bias from central processing.
(c) The minimal total transmission cost can still be
guaranteed at the end with system constraints satisfied.
(d) When a new trade is added, previous trade schedules
will not change. This is extremely attractive as
compared with centralized optimization approaches.
(e) The new approach does not need transmission cost
allocation calculation since it can obtain transmission
cost of each trade during the process.
(f) The area power generation cost can also be included
easily by introducing a fictitious ‘supply area - tie
line’ set as mentioned before.
III. MULTI-AGENT SYSTEM MODELING
I initialization I
r
cheapest path
search
y
2
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Figure 2: Functional Framework of the Multi-agent System
In our model each regional network is assumed to be a
rational agent, who only has partial information, including
the identity numbers of itself and the immediate neighbors,
and the data of the tie-lines incident to itself, such as prices,
capacities, and the existing flows. Each agent is responsible
for updating related local information. We also assume that
the communicate channels are perfect.
There are two major fimctions in the system by the
communication of the agents. One is the cheapest path
searching, the other is the cheapest path negotiation. The
functional framework of this multi-agent system is shown
in figure 2.
Initialization:
Each agent collects the local information and sends the
synchronizing message.
Cheapest ~ath search:
A generic label-correcting algorithm [6] is modified to
compute the cheapest path by successively updating the
cost labels. Each agent maintains a set of cost labels po at
every stage. The label p(j) is either CC,indicating that it has
yet to discover a directed path from the source to agentj, or
it is the cost of some directed path from the source to agent
j, For each agent j a predecessor index, predfj), is also
maintained which records the agent prior to agent j in the
current directed path of cost p(j). At termination,
predecessor indices allow each agent to trace the cheapest
path from the source node back to agent j. Detailed
algorithm can be found in Ref. [6].
Cheauest ~ath negotiation:
After each agent knows the identity number of its
preceding agent along the cheapest path, it will send the
message to the preceding agent for the usage of that
regional network, There are three actions for a rational
agent when receiving such request: (1) selfish plan when
the receiver is a deficit agent, i.e., to decline the requests
and refuse other agents to use its own regional networks
until its own loads are fidly supplied; (2) modest plan when
the receiver is a balanced agent, i.e., to pass on the received
requests to the preceding agent on the cheapest path and
allow other agents to use its own regional networks by
charging transit fees. (3) ego-centric plan when the receiver
is a excess agent, i.e., to accept the requests based on the
rule of “first come and fust serve” and allow other agents
to use its own networks.
Termination:
When no agent sends request to other agents, that
means all the loads are supplied, then the system terminates.
The advantages of this model lie in that:
(a) There is no centralized owner or controller of the global
information about the network. Therefore, any agent
does not depend on the centralized information to make
decisions.
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(b) Each agent only has local information. Therefore it
knows neither the global structure of the network, nor
the numbers of agents in the network. This structure is
quite attractive to develop a competitive market.
(c) The minimum transmission cost could be achieved by
communication and cooperation among all agents.
(d) Each agent is satisfied with its choice since all the
trades are resulted fi-omrational behavior.
IV. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
‘? F ‘ F
I INTERNET 1
(+AgentName Server
Figure 3 infrastructure of MASCAN
TNe have implemented a multi-agent system on the
Internet — MASCAN (Multi-agent System for Cost
Allocation on Network). Fig. 3 shows the infrastructure of
MASCAN. Agent communication is done via the Intemet.
The agent name server provides agent registration service
and the Internet connections for all agents. Fig. 4 shows a
java applet and represents the agent E of the test system in
Section V. The agent name and password are used to
register the agent into the agent name server.
The execution time to process a message is always O(1),.
in MASCAN. The worst case of executio~ in MASCAN is
that each agent processes a message sequentially. Therefore,
the time complexity of MASCAN equals to that of the
message complexity. Hence we only need to analyze the
message complexity.
The cheapest path computation needs to be executed
one time within a round of negotiations. The message
complexity of the cheapest path computation is 0(m2n).
There are at most O(nD~aJ rounds of negotiation in
MASCAN, where D.ax is the largest demand of a given
network. Finally, we can conclude that the message
complexity and time complexity of MASCAN is
O(m2n2D.aJ. (The time complexity will be much better in
practice because all the agents may execute concurrently).
Therefore the performance of the system is satisfactory.
V. COMPUTER RESULTS
A 5-area test system [7] (see Fig. 5) is used for
computer test and to show how our method works based on
multi-agent technology.
Q 1000 @ 300
“’gow’oo)
$500
Figure 5 the test system schematic diagram
In Fig. 5 each bigger circle represents a regional
network connected by tie lines to other networks. The
number inside a circle represents the assumed transmission
cost of per unit flow for transit through the regional
systems. Each tie line has two parameters put in a
parenthesis. The f~st number represents the transmission
cost for per unit flow and the second number the
transmission capacity of the tie line. The number by the
side of a generator (or a demand) means the available
generation capability (or the amount of load demand).
Region A and B are net exporters, they will execute the
egocentric plan, Region D and E are net importers, so we
assume they will execute the selfish plan when they are
deficit, and then execute the modest plan when they
become balanced. Region C is a transmit region with no net
import/export, so it executes the modest plan.
1‘tround
The cheapest path from an excess agent (i.e., agent B) to
agent D is the path B-D and the cheapest path from agent B
to agent E is the path B-D-E. E sends a request to D to
augment a flow of 800 units, and D sends a request to B to
augment a flow of 500 units. Because agent D is deficit
area executing a selfish plan, it will reject the request from
agent E to augment a flow via agent D. While agent B is an
excess agent who executes the egocentric plan. So B will
accept the request by augmenting available 300 units
0-7803-6674-3/00/$10.00 (C) 2000 IEEE
0-7803-6674-3/00/$10.00 (C) 2000 IEEE 12230-7803-6672-7/01/$1 .00 (C) 2 01 I EE
through networks of B to agent D, as illustrated by figure
6(a).
(2,900)
(a) Cost of trade B-D; (8+2+4).300=4200
9
‘~ 1000
\
(2,600)
y 200
(b) Cost of trade A-B-D: (2+1+8+2+4).200=3400
(2,400)
(c) Cost of trade A-B-D-E: (2+1+8+2+4+2+4)x200=4600
600
n
(1,900)
(2,200)
u
(d) Cost of trade A-B-C-E: (2+1+8+4+4+3+4)x600=15600
?’OOO?300
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(e) Final solution of flows
Figure 6 Illustration of negotiation process
2“dround
After the 1‘t round, the cheapest path fi-om an excess
agent (i.e., agent A) to agent D is the path A-B-D and the
cheapest path tlom agent A to agent E is the path A-B-D-E.
Because agent D still is a deficit agent who is executing the
selfish plan, it rejects the request fi-omagent E to augment a
flow via agent D. While agent B is a balanced agent who is
executing the modest plan. It then passes agent D’s request
to A. Owing to the egocentric plan, agent A then approves
the request to augment a flow of 200 units from agent A to
agent D, as illustrated by figure 6(b).
3rdround
After the 2“d round, the cheapest path from the excess
agent A to agent E is the path A-B-D-E. Since agent D
becomes balanced, now all the agents (except A) along the
path are the balanced agents who will execute modest plans.
So the request sent by E is passed on until it reaches A.
Furthermore, all the regional networks along the path could
be used at a transit fee. Because of the congestion of tie-
line D-E, only 200 units are augmented flom agent A to
agent E, as illustrated by figure 6(c).
4’hround
After the 3rdround, since the tie-line D-E has been filly
used, the cheapest path from the excess agent A to agent E
now is the path A-B-C-E. The balanced agents along the
path (except A) merely pass on the requests received to
their predecessors until agent A gets the request. As the
excess agent executing egocentric plan, A then approves the
request to augment 600 units from agent A to agent D, as
illustrated by figure 6(d).
Table 1: Cost Allocation (in money units)
cost flow I Paymentfor service I Incomefrom service
A o 2000
B
Area ~ o 10400
Network o 2400
D 7600 2800
E 20200 3200
A-B o 1000
B-C o 2400
Tie line C-E o 1800
B-D o 1400
C-D o 0
E-D o 400
Total 27800 27800
When negotiations end, the wholesale cross-border
trades are finalized, and so is the cost of the trades. The
final flow of trades for the whole system is shown in Fig.
6(e), and it is easy to check that the optimal cost of 27800
for the problem (1) is also achieved. A summary of the
trade costs is listed in Table 1. Totally agent D needs to pay
3400+4200=7600 by receiving 300-units power from agent
B and 200-units power tlom agent A, while agent E needs
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to pay 4600+15600=20200 by receiving 800-units power
from agent A going through two different paths. It is easy
to prove the cost allocation result is the equilibrium point of
the non-cooperative game for these five players [8].
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a decentralized
structure to make cross-border trade planning using multi-
agent technology under transmission open access. In the
system, each agent represents a regional network, which
acts rationally to protect its own benefit, Although each
agent does not receive any centralized information to
guarantee the autonomous behavior, the minimum cost of
the whole system is achieved finally. This structure
provides a theoretical basis for the electricity to join the E-
commerce. We have implemented a multi-agent system
MASCAN by Java programming language. The
demonstration on a 5-area simple system shows that the
approach is effective and promising.
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